2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... ●

: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective.

The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition" 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

: Nondemocratic leaders have smaller coalitions and can use the rents (extra resources) created by economic restrictions to buy off their core supporters, often making them more secure rather than less. Onset and Initiation : Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure. Onset and Initiation Democracies are more frequent senders

The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University

: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.

Institutional theories of sanctions combine elements of the punishment and expressive approaches. Like the punishment perspective, Florida State University An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success